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Abstract: Research pragmatics, not a defective conceptual framework, 
supports modern biological reductionism. Conducting research to reveal  
the casual web underlying the multiple developmental pathways leading 
to any species-specific characteristic requires better research techniques  
than those commonly used. It takes much patience, time, and effort to gain 
even small glimpses of an answer to any developmental question. 
Lifelines presents a coherent account of living systems that inte-
grates physics, chemistry, and biology in a way that is intended to 
undercut any attempt to use only reductionistic explanations of  
the human condition. As Rose notes, deterministic biological ex-
planations resurfaced during the late 1960s without any specific 
advance in biological science or theory. However, they have been 
advanced (to the dismay of thoughtful scientists) by recent bio-
medical and popular interpretations of modern molecular genetics 
and neuroscience. Rose argues that the reductionist trend  stems 
from both a tradition of determinism in biological training and 
thinking and the failure of “opponents of biological determinism 
... to offer a coherent alternative framework within which  to 
interpret living processes” (p. ix). However, many such frame-
works have been proposed during the last 100 years and several  
quite recently (cf. Elman et al. 1996; Gottlieb et al. 1998; Michel  
& Moore 1995). Why then does reductionism persist? 
The reductionist tradition certainly influences the way many bi-
ologically oriented investigators pose research questions, apply re- 
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search techniques, interpret findings, and train students. It does  so 
because this is more efficient in generating research results and providing 
ready interpretations than research that “celebrates complexity” and 
focuses on the specific dynamics of the organism- environment system 
over its life-span. While I appreciate Rose’s efforts, biological 
determinism will continue to dominate because unraveling the 
organismic-experiential causal web underlying the multiple 
developmental pathways of species-typical characteristics is not 
easily done, nor is there a generally accepted set of techniques for doing 
so. 
In contrast, researchers in neuroscience, molecular and behavior 
genetics, sociobiology, and cognitive science, have shown that  it is 
relatively easy to conduct research on questions of proximate causation, 
phylogenetic relationships, and adaptive function.  There are many 
ways to investigate the contributions of genes and various neural 
processes and structures to behavior and many of these involve 
exciting new technologies to attract popular interest. Of course, only 
reductionism assumes the nervous system to be organized by gene-
controlled processes (Rose nicely illuminates the difference between 
genetic involvement and genetic control). Sociobiology has 
demonstrated the efficiency of collecting data  that address alternative 
game-theoretical or economic models of generalized types of behavior, 
presumably controlled by genes. Such results fit current thinking 
about adaptation and natural selection so well that they tempt researchers 
away from pursuing developmental questions. 
In contrast, typical developmental research techniques are limited 
and problematic. Many studies involve correlating individual differences 
earlier and later in development. This does not reveal whether the 
individuals have changed between measurement periods (a 
developmental event). Nor do these studies reveal the developmental 
processes that contribute to maintaining relative position across age 
periods. The absence of correlation may be interpreted by 
reductionists as indicating that early developmental events have no 
impact on later events because they are biologically controlled. 
Alternatively, high correlation may be interpreted as strong 
biological control during that age period. 
Other developmental techniques examine the relation between  a 
manipulation (or clinical event) occurring earlier in development 
and the individual’s characteristics later in development.  Even if a 
relation exists, nothing is revealed about the causal web connecting the 
two developmental periods. If a relation does not exist, nothing is 
revealed about the processes that blocked the connection. 
A common technique of depriving an organism of certain ex-
periences to determine their influence on development presumes that 
one already knows or suspects that such experiences contribute to 
development. A few carefully crafted programmatic  studies have 
revealed that development can depend upon experiences which do 
not at first appear to be relevant. Thus, the absence of deprivation 
effects only means that the missing experiences were not relevant for 
that developmental outcome, or if they were, that their loss could be 
compensated for by other means.  For example, in some bird species, 
song can develop without hearing other singing birds or the bird’s own 
singing, but that does not rule out other auditory experience. Even if for 
some species all auditory experience were ruled out, other 
experiences (e.g., vestibular and/or respiratory experience, or specific 
social experiences) could be involved (Clayton 1994). Thus, 
although deprivation  studies can fail to reveal how develop occurs, they 
can support reductionist interpretations. 
Since models of learning often fail to provide insight into the 
development of many species-typical characteristics, some argue that 
individual experience is unimportant for them. However,  learning 
models represent only a small part of the range of experiential events 
that contribute to development, some of them  seemingly irrelevant. 
Most stimulation studies fail to identify the experiential influences on 
development because they provide either a broad-band level of 
stimulation that approximates those  that are characteristic of the 
natural environment more than the   
usual laboratory situation, or they provide unusually high levels of 
very complex stimulation. No one would deny that approximating  
a normal environment can support normal development or that  
normal development can be disrupted by stress or overstimula-
tion. Hence such studies do not challenge reductionism. Only a  
few studies (e.g., bird-song, imprinting, sex differences in rat be-
havior) have manipulated levels and patterns of stimulation within 
the bounds of their normal occurrence to identify their contribu-
tion to the development of species-typical behavior (cf. Gottlieb  
et al. 1998; Ten Cate 1994; Moore 1992). In each case, such ex-
periences are profoundly involved in the normal development of  
the species-typical behavior. [See also Baker: “The Biology of 
Bird-Song Dialects” BBS 8(1) 1985; Johnston: “Development, Ex-
planation and the Ontogeny of Bird Song–Nature” BBS 11(4) 
1988.] 
Careful, time-consuming, programmatic investigations need to  
be encouraged if we are to understand development and avoid  
what some see as the pitfalls of reductionism. 
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